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Ferguson: Property--Construing the Deed in South Carolina

PROPERTY-CONSTRUING THE DEED
IN SOUTH CAROLINA*
I. APPLYmG ThE RuLEs OF LAw
Facts and Contentions
In Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas1 the South Carolina Supreme
Court. was asked to determine the quantum of estate conveyed
by a deed set out in part as follows:
I, T. C. Hammond in the State aforesaid, Aiken
County, in consideration of the sum of Eighty &
no/100 Dollars to be paid by Tom McCain, James
Smith, & William Hammond as Trustees of Carys Hill
School in the State aforesaid Edgefield County have
granted, bargained, sold and released, and by these
presents do grant, bargain, sell and release unto the
said Tom McCain, James Smith and William Hammond, their successors and assigns, All that lot or parcel
of land in the State & County above named containing Four (4) acres and bounded East, North & West
by lands of the Grantor (T. C. Hammond) and South
by lands of H. W. MeKie.
It is specifically understood and agreed by all parties
that the land is to be used for school purposes onlyshould it ever be used for other purposes the said property is to be revert [sic] to him the said T. C. Hammond or his heirs and assigns forever.
A.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the
premises before mentioned unto the said Tom McCain,
James Smith and William Hammond, their successors
and assigns forever.2
The plaintiff claimed ownership through successive conveyances
from the above named grantees, and the defendant claimed title
through successive assignments of the reversionary interest. The
parties stipulated that the land had ceased to be used for school
purposes.
*

Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 159 S.E2d 46 (1968).

1. 250 S.C. 495, 159 S.E2d 46 (1968).
2. Id.
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The plaintiff contended that the above named grantees took
an estate in fee simple absolute. The plaintiff advanced the
rule of property that once a fee simple absolute is created it
cannot be cut down by subsequent words in the deed; therefore the original grantor's condition was void. Furthermore,
the plaintiff maintained that even if the condition were valid,
the defendant would have no interest in the land because of the
rule that a possibility of reverter is an interest too nebulous to
be transferred. The plaintiff pointed out that the defendant
claimed title through successive assignments of the reversionary
3
interest and not as an heir of the original grantor.
The defendant contended that the original grantor's expressed condition should be given effect. He argued that the
deed created a fee simple determinable. Conceding that a grant
in fee simple cannot be cut down by superadded words, the
defendant argued that the rule applies to a fee simple determin4
able as well as to a fee simple absolute.
B. The Court Interpretation:The Legal Deed Approach.
Affirming a circuit court decree, adjudging the plaintiff in
StyZecraft to be owner in fee simple absolute, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that when the granting clause purports to
convey title in fee simple absolute, that estate may not be cut
down by subsequent words in the instrument.
The court said that this rule of law had been violated and,
the grantor's expressed condition of defeasance was thereby
defeated. This rule, which will be examined later, was predicated upon the court's assumption that a fee simple absolute
was in fact created.
The court, in making this assumption, implied that the deed
complied with another rule of law-that the technical words of
inheritance are required to transfer a fee simple interest in real

property.5 There are exceptions,( but an inter vivos conveyance
3. This argument is not conclusive of the issue. If the deed created a fee

simple determinable, the possibility of reverter left in the grantor or his heirs
would automatically become a present estate in possession on the occurrence of
the event specified in the instrument. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 98 (1962). While not shown in the record, it is possible that the assignment was made by the grantor or his then living heirs after
the land had ceased to be used for school purposes. If so, defendant would have
good title to the land.
4. Although this point is well taken, defendant only begs the question of
whether a fee simple absolute can be cut down by a fee simple determinable.
5. Means, Words of Inheritance in Deeds of Land in South Carolina: .4
Title Examiner's Guide, 5 S.C.L.Q. 313 (1953).
6. Id.
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of an exclusively legal interest, to named individuals,' has
heretofore come within the operation of the rule." The grantor
was acting in his own right as owner of the land, and, according to the court, the persons named as grantees acquired title
for their own personal use.
There were no words of inheritance, however, in the disputed
deed. The grant was to McCain, Smith and Hammond, "their
successors and assigns." Thus, it would seem that some lesser
estate was created. It is generally held that such a grantee
would take a life estate.9 Since the conditional limitation would
not have been inconsistent with a life estate by implication, 0 the
deed would appear to create, in spite of the court's assumption,
a determinable life estate."
0.

The Case for a Trust Deed Coswtnwtion
The South Carolina Supreme Court once stated that an instrument "in form and substance an ordinary trust deed conveying
real estate in trust . . . must be construed as such."' 2 This
point should have been raised in Stylecraft. Although not considered, expressly at least, by the litigants or the court, there
is good reason to believe that the instrument was in fact a trust
deed.
Immediately preceding the granting clause, the grantees are
named and identified as "Trustees of Carys Hill School." While
such a designation does not conclusively evidence a trust,'13 it is
generally a factor to be considered in the interpretation of any
instrument. 14 In S t ykearaft the only facts presented were the
7. The word "individuals" is used to denote natural persons. On the question

of whether words of inheritance are required to transfer a fee simple to a
corporation, the South Carolina Supreme Court recently said that it was not
necessarily the law that words of succession were not needed. Southern Ry. v.

Smoak, 243 S.C. 331, 133 S.E.2d 806 (1963). Thus, it would be wise, if not
necessary, to include words of succession (if not words of inheritance) in a
grant of fee simple to a corporation.

8. See McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S.C. 555, 29 S.E. 403 (1898).

9. Grainger v. Hamilton, 228 S.C. 318, 90 S.E.2d 209 (1955); Atlantic
Coast Lumber Corp. v. Langston Lumber Co., 128 S.C. 7, 122 S.E. 395
(1911); McMillan v. Hughes, 88 S.C. 296, 70 S.E. 804 (1911); Sullivan v.
Moore, 84 S.C. 426, 65 S.E. 108 (1910).
10. Wilson v. Poston, 129 S.C. 345, 123 S.E. 849 (1924).
11. The reversion following a life estate is freely alienable. C. MOYNIHAK,
INTR DUcION TO THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 95 (1962). Thus, defendant
could have acquired good title through assignment irrespective of the condition
of defeasance.
12. Steele v. Smith, 84 S.C. 464, 468, 66 S.E. 200, 201 (1909).
13. Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 1937); Union Guardian
Trust Co. v. Nichols, 311 Mich. 107, 18 N.W.2d 383 (1945).
14. See Bank of Charleston v. Dowling, 52 S.C. 345, 29 S.E. 788 (1897).

The court held that while the words "to and upon the trust" indicated an
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deed itself and the stipulation that the land had ceased to be
used for school purposes. But it is quite conceivable that the
grantees were in fact trustees of the Carys Hill School and that
they took title to the property in that capacity.
If the school were an unincorporated association the property
would quite naturally have been transferred to trustees. Such
an organization is not a legal entity and therefore cannot take
or hold title to property. 15 It can, however, be a beneficiary
under a trust.1 If incorporated, it is reasonable to assume that
the school had trustees who, in turn, had certain duties with
respect to the maintenance and control of the school's property.117 Either theory is consistent with the fact that' the named
grantees paid the consideration and were the subsequent transferors of the property.
If the identification of the grantees "as trustees" did in fact
signify the existence of a trust, the court's construction of the
deed could have been different.' 8 In its equity jurisdiction over
trusts a court is not bound by the technical rules of the common
law and will seek the intention of the grantor from the whole
instrument. 19 The grantor's manifest intent was to create a
defeasible fee simple. The court could so construe the deed because (1) technical words of inheritance are not required to
transfer a fee simple interest under a trust deed, 20 and (2) the
court would not be bound by the common law rule which would
otherwise defeat this expressed intent.
intent to create a trust, it was overridden by the conferral of an absolute power
of disposal without accountability on the purported trustee.

15. MacGregor v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 337 Mass. 484, 99
(the common law rule); see Shields v. jolly, 1 Rich. Eq.
99 (S.C. 1844). The members of the association will take title in their individual capacity. The court suggested that if there were so many members as
to make this impractical, some of the members could hold title as trustees for
the association.
16. Krall v. Light, 240 Mo. App. 480, 210 S.W.2d 739 (1948).
17. The imposition of such duties would make the trust active and the
Statute of Uses would not execute the use. Thus, legal title would remain in
the trustees. Foster v. Glover, 46 S.C. 522, 24 S.E. 370 (1896).
18. The fact that the words of trust did not appear in the grant is of no
consequence. McCown v. King, 23 S.C. 232 (1885). The court imposed a trust
on a grantee who would have otherwise taken a legal fee simple for his own
use even though the words of trust appeared only in the warranty clause. The
court said that it is legitimate to transpose the clauses in order to give effect
to each part of the deed.
19. Bartlett v. Aycock, 109 S.C. 436, 95 S.E. 188 (1918).
20. Hogg v. Clemmons, 126 S.C. 469, 120 S.E. 96 (1923); McMichael v.
-McMichael, 51 S.C. 555, 29 S.E. 403 (1898).
N.E.2d 468 (1951)
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RULE OF LAW THAT A GRANT IN Fim SIDPLE
ABSOLUTE MAY NOT BE CUT DOWN AND THE

DmmAsmi

ESTATES

The rule rests upon the proposition that
[a]n estate in fee simple is the entire and absolute prop-

erty of the subject, and therefore, when one grants such
an estate he can make no further disposition of the
property for he has already granted the whole21 and
entire interest that it is possible for him to have.
It is also a product of the old common law maxim that a deed
should be construed most strongly against the grantor.22 Moreover, the rule seems to be as tantamount to the rule of construction that when there are two incompatible clauses in a deed, the
first will prevail over the latter.23
Since the rule was applied in Stylecraft to defeat an expressed
condition,24 the court could have realistically labeled it a rule of
policy to prevent the entailing of land titles. The rule may consistently be seen as an adjunct of the South Carolina Supreme
21. Keels v. Crosswell, 180 S.C. 63, 65, 185 S.E. 39, 40 (1936).
27- Edwards v. Edwards, 2 Strob. Eq. 101 (S.C. 1848).
23. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Ford, 177 S.C. 40, 180 S.E.

562 (1935) ; Crawford v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Co., 79 S.C. 166, 60 S.E. 445

(1908). Rules of construction, however, were designed-theoretically at least
-to reach, not defeat the grantor's intention. See Rhodes v. Black, 170 S.C.
193, 170 S.E. 158 (1933). They are rebuttable by clearly expressed intent. See
Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360, 70 S.E.2d 637 (1952) (constructional rules
subservient to the overall intent expressed in the instrument) ; Pope v. Patterson, 78 S.C. 334, 58 S.E. 945 (1907). Where "the intention of the parties can
be plainly ascertained, arbitrary rules are not to be resorted to." Id. at 339-40,
58 S.E. at 947, quoting from 2 R. DmiN, A TtMATiSE ON THE LAW OF Ds
§ 836 (no date available).
24. See also Shealy v. Shealy, 120 S.C. 276, 113 S.E. 131 (1922) (held that
a grant to A, his heirs, and assigns forever, subject to the covenant, conditions,
terms, and limitations hereinafter set forth, conveyed a fee simple absolute);
Keels v. Crosswell, 180 S.C. 63, 185 S.E. 39 (1936) (held grant to A, his
heirs, and assigns forever, but if he dies without heirs of his own body, the
land shall revert to my own estate, conveyed a fee simple absolute). The rule
has been applied in cases in which the grantor apparently attempted to limit a
grant of a fee simple conditional to a life estate. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 187 S.C.
86, 196 S.E. 541 (1938); Antley v. Antley, 132 S.C. 306, 128 S.E. 31 (1925).
The rule was previously applied to strike down attempted reservations in favor
of grantor and spouse. See Glenn v. Jamison, 48 S.C. 316, 26 S.E. 677 (1897)
(limitation over in favor of third party also held void). But more recently
these reservations have been held valid. Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221 S.C. 322, 70
S.E.2d 432 (1952). Cases -holding opposite were distinguished in the following
manner: "The facts of each of them were quite different from that of the comparatively simple deed which is now under construction. They were concerned
with attempted limitations or conditions upon the estates granted, not reservations or exceptions from the grants, as here." Id. at 326, 70 S.E.2d at 433.
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Court's abhorrence of forfeitures 25 and the court's resultant
policy of construing conditions subsequent most strictly against
the grantor.2 6 Viewed from this perspective the rule may be
reconciled with the fact that both the fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent 27 and the fee simple determinable2 s are
recognized in South Carolina. Moreover, there is no inherent
incompatibility between this rule and the defeasible fees. As
the South Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged at an early
date, "he that hath a fee simple conditional or qualified, hath
as ample and great an estate as he that hath a fee simple
absolute . . . .29
It has been held that the fee simple conditional, like the fee
simple absolute, cannot be limited by superadded words.3 0 Thus,
the susceptibility of the other defeasible fees to this rule seems
to be directly related to the grantor's form of expressed intent.
Unlike the fee simple conditional in which the words of purchase are peculiar to that estate,"' these defeasible fees are
created by a grant in fee simple absolute and words of condition.s 2 Aside from the rules of construction concerning the
priorities of clauses in a deed,33 Stylecraft implies that the conditional words must appear in the same clause as the grant of
the fee, and should be closely connected therewith.3 4 In fact, to
avoid this rule, it might be wise to insert the words of defeas25. Chavis v. Chavis, 57 S.C. 173, 35 S.E. 507 (1899).
26. Rhodes v. Black, 170 S.C. 193, 170 S.E. 158 (1933); McManaway v.
Clapp, 150 S.C. 249, 148 S.E. 18 (1928).
27. White v. Britton, 75 S.C. 428, 56 S.E. 232 (1906); First Presbyterian
Church v. Elliot, 65 S.C. 251, 43 S.E. 674 (1903).
28. First Baptist Church v. Turner, 248 S.C. 71, 149 S.E.2d 45 (1966);

Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.Zd 913 (1959).

29. Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265, 270 (S.C. 1833) (quoting Lord Coke),
quoted in Adams v. Verner, 102 S.C. 7, 18, 86 S.E. 211, 215 (1915).
30. Sims v. Clayton, 193 S.C. 98, 7 S.E.2d 724 (1940); Antley v. Antley,
132 S.C. 306, 128 S.E. 31 (1925).
31. Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265 (S.C. 1833). It was contended that a
limitation in form to A and his heirs, but if he die without issue, over, created
a fee simple conditional. Holding that A took a fee simple absolute, the court
said that in no case shall a fee simple conditional be raised by implication.
Moreover, under the common law it would take the words "heirs of the body."
Contra, United States v. 15,883.55 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. 849 (W.D.S.C.
1944) (no particular form of words are necessary).
32. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 35-36

(1962).

33. See Note, The Effect of a Conflict Between the Granting and Habendum

Clauses in Deeds in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 431 (1958).

34. This would avoid any question of whether or not the condition is in fact
in the same clause as, and part of, the grant. See Shealy v. Shealy, 120 S.C.
276, 113 S.E. 131 (1922).
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ance immediately before the grantee is named so that the grant
itself would be conditional.3 5 Of course, the reversionary interest should be expressly excepted.3 6
HI. CONcLUsIoN
As evidenced by Stylec aft, clearly expressed intent is not
always sufficient to insure the desired disposition of real property. The manifestation of intent must conform to the requirements of law. Stylecraft presents two extremes: a relaxation of
one requirement and a stringent application of another. The
case provides authority sub silentio for the proposition that the
technical words of inheritance are not required to convey a fee
simple absolute if other words of similar import are used. But
Styleeraft is probably more properly viewed as an expression
of the South Carolina Supreme Court's disfavor with conditions
of defeasance. The court used a questionable rule of law to
defeat the attempted creation of an estate which is embraced
within and respected by the rule. While the court's approach
might accord with good public policy, it does pose practical
problems to the grantor who wants to create a defeasible fee.
Moreover, such a precedent may very well imperil presently
vested rights-rights which heretofore have been accorded great
37
consideration with respect to the operation of the rules of law.
Since the defeasible fees are in fact recognized in South Carolina, Styeraft and the rule employed therein should have no
precedential value in the construction of similar instruments.
CARL G. FERGusoN
35. The idea of inserting the condition before creating the fee may be some-

what unorthodox. But it appears to be the reasoning employed in an earlier
case in which the condition appeared in the granting clause and the fee was
created in the habendum. The court gave effect to the condition and held that
the deed created a defeasible fee. Wilson v. Poston, 129 S.C. 345, 123 S.E. 849
(1924). And the rule speaks only of limitations following the grant of the fee.
36. Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923).

Courts will always attempt to construe clauses in a deed as covenants rather
than conditions.
37. See Sullivan v. Moore, 84 S.C. 426, 65 S.E. 108 (1910). The court
explains why it must follow the common law rule requiring words of inheritance to convey a fee simple.

The rule serves generally as a snare to those unlearned in technical law, and it would be difficult to suggest any reason for its
continued existence; but it has been so long established in this

State that the Courts can not now overrule the cases laying it
down without imperilling vested rights.
Id. at 428, 65 S.E. at 108.
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